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The Development of Professional
Judgment in Law School
Litigation Courses: The Concepts
of Trial Theory and Theme
Edward J. Imwinkelried*
I was delighted when the Vanderbilt Law Review asked me to
submit a short essay on trial advocacy. This Essay allows me to
discuss two concepts, the trial theory and theme, that should be
highlighted in every law school litigation course. Several years ago
I wrote a text on commercial litigation for practitioners.1 That text
proposed definitions for the concepts of "theory" and "theme"2
and suggested that trial attorneys organize their pretrial prepara-
tion3 and trial presentation in terms of those concepts. Since the
publication of the text, I have attempted to refine the concepts and
to use the concepts to restructure my trial practice course. I am
now convinced both of the soundness of the concepts and of their
utility as a conceptual framework for teaching trial advocacy.
Section I of this Essay sets out the definitions of trial theory
and theme. Section II argues that the very purpose of the pretrial
stages of litigation is to enable the trial attorney to select a theory
and theme for trial. Section III explains how the choice of theory
and theme dictates virtually everything that the attorney does at
trial. The conclusion urges that law professors structure litigation
courses to teach the concepts of theory and theme in addition to
mechanics and tactics. So structured, a litigation course can help
the student develop the sense of prudential judgment that is val-
ued in a legal counselor.
* Professor, University of California, Davis. B.A. 1967, University of San Francisco;
J.D. 1969, University of San Francisco College of Law.
1. E. IMWINKELRIED, HANDBOOK FOR THE TRIAL OF CONTRACT LAwsurrs: STRATEGIES AND
TECHNIQUES (1981).
2. Id. § 1-2.
3. Id. § 1-3.
4. Id. § 1-4.
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I. THE DEFINITIONS OF TRIAL THEORY AND THEME
The literature on trial advocacy frequently utilizes the expres-
sions "theory" and "theme." According to leading litigators,
"'[t]heme building' is a familiar subject to all experienced trial at-
torneys." 5 Some practitioners assert that in a complex case, the use
of a theme is the key to success.6 Other practitioners state that
case theory development is essential. James Brosnahan, former
chairperson of the American Bar Association Litigation Section's
Trial Practice Committee, has characterized the use of a theory as
a basic principle of advocacy." In many writings on the subject by
trial attorneys, the words "theory" and "theme" are used
synonymously.9
The academic commentary on the subject also is replete with
references to theory and theme. Numerous commentators counsel
the trial attorney to select a single theory of the case.' 0 Professor
McElhaney, one of the most prolific commentators on advocacy,
has declared that the necessity for a theory is "[o]ne of the most
fundamental rules in trial practice."" Choosing a theory is said to
be "the first order of business.' 1 2 Other commentators stress the
need for a trial theme.' Occasionally, however, the academic com-
mentaries imply that there may be a distinction between a theory
and a theme.14 The thesis of this Essay is not only that theory and
theme are distinguishable but also that perceiving the distinction
is imperative to understanding the pretrial and trial processes.
5. Turley, Voir Dire-"It's Just a Whiplash", 21 TRIAL, Aug. 1985, at 88.
6. E.g., Arthurs, Decision Tree Sprouts into King-Size Settlement: In Complex Case,
the Theme Is the Key, LEGAL TIMES, July 29, 1985, at 1.
7. E.g., Shrager, The Strategy of Theory Development, 17 TRIAL, June 1981, at 39
("subject of proper theory development has substantive, strategic, and practical
implications").
8. Brosnahan, Basic Principles of Advocacy: One Trial Lawyer's View, 9 THE DocKET,
Summer 1985, at 1, 7.
9. See Jordan, Establishing a Theme: An Interview with Susan Jordan, TRIAL DIPL.
J., Fall 1984, at 5.
10. See, e.g., K HEGLAND, TRIAL AND PRACTICE SKILLS 51, 53 (1978); R KEwON, TRIAL
TACTICS AND METHODS § 10.6 (2d ed. 1973); T. MAuET. FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TCHNIQUES
§ 1.4 (1980).
11. McElhaney, The Theory of the Case, 6 LITIGATION, Fall 1979, at 51.
12. -J. TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW, TACTICS AND ETHICS 148 (1983).
13. See S. GOLDBERG, THE FIRST TRIAL: WHERE Do I SIT? WHAT Do I SAY? 89-94
(1982).
14. See, e.g., id. at 89-95; J. JEANS, TRIAL ADVOCACY §§ 4.29, 8.4 (1975); J. TANFORD,




For our purposes, the theory is the set of all the ultimate facts
that the attorney must prove to justify the legal outcome that the
attorney's client desires. 15 The theory of the case is more particu-
larized than a list of the essential legal elements of a cause of ac-
tion. In a substantive law instruction on a breach of contract cause
of action, the trial judge might instruct the jury that the elements
of the cause of action are as follows: The plaintiff and defendant
formed a contract; the contract imposed a duty on the defendant
and required the plaintiff to fulfill certain conditions to the duty;
the plaintiff satisfied all the conditions; the defendant wrongfully
breached the duty; and the plaintiff suffered damage as a result of
the breach.16 The theory is more detailed and fact specific than a
list of abstract legal elements. 7 Thus, a plaintiff's theory might be:
On January 1, 1985, the plaintiff and defendant entered into a con-
tract in Nashville, Tennessee; the contract required the defendant
to deliver a generator to the plaintiff on March 1, 1985 and re-
quired the plaintiff to pay the defendant $50,000 on February 1,
1985 to activate the defendant's duty; the plaintiff paid the
$50,000 on February 1; the defendant failed to deliver the genera-
tor on March 1; and the plaintiff incurred $15,000 in damages
when she purchased a more expensive substitute generator on
April 1, 1985.
Just as the plaintiff or prosecutor can have a theory of the
case, so can the defense. A defense theory is possible whether the
defense is relying on a simple defense or a true affirmative defense.
In the case of a simple defense that negates an element of the
plaintiff's or prosecutor's prima facie case, the theory is the con-
verse of an element of the plaintiff's or prosecutor's theory. One of
the elements of the opposition's theory is A, and the defense
claims non-A. For example, an element of the prosecutor's theory
might be that the defendant was at the crime scene, 150 Wall
Street, at 9:00 p.m., on May 1, 1985, when a battery allegedly oc-
curred. A simple alibi defense would be that the defendant was
elsewhere at the time, namely, 44 Madison Avenue.
Alternatively, suppose that the defendant relies on a true af-
15. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 1, § 1-2.
16. See generally 3 E. BRANSON & A. REID, THE LAW OF INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES IN
CIvIL AND CRIMINAL CASES ch. 56 (3d ed. 1961) (listing various state court jury instructions
in contract actions).
17. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 1, § 1-2.
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firmative defense in the nature of confession and avoidance plead-
ing; the defense is willing to concede the elements of the plaintiff's
or prosecutor's prima facie case but attempts to establish addi-
tional facts that will avoid responsibility. The defense may be en-
trapment.18 The defense theory could be: On June 1, 1985, a third
party implanted the idea for the crime in the defendant's mind;
the third party was an undercover police officer; the officer made
the suggestion to the defendant to induce the defendant to commit
the crime; 19 and the third party's conduct was such that it was
likely to induce even a normally law-abiding person to commit the
crime.20
The use of a theory allows the attorney to simplify the trial
presentation for the jury. In contemporary federal practice, the
standard for discoverability is whether information is logically rele-
vant to the subject matter of the case.21 During discovery, the at-
torney may obtain information even though it is not relevant to
the issues currently pleaded in the case.22 The information is dis-
coverable as long as the pleadings could be amended to encompass
the issue.2' Given this lax standard, in a complex case tens of mil-
lions of documents may be discoverable.24 In the IBM antitrust
case, 2 5 the parties produced over sixty-four million pages of docu-
ments within the first five years of discovery.26 Nor is the phenom-
enon limited to federal court. Prior to the tentative settlement of
the Houston Lighting & Power" case in Texas state court, the par-
ties exchanged over forty million pages of documents.2 8
At trial, the standard for admissibility is whether the item of
evidence is logically relevant to an issue then pleaded in the case. "
The Federal Rules of Evidence liberally define logical relevance as
18. See United States v. Pugliese, 346 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1965).
19. See People v. McIntire, 78 Cal. App. 3d 844, 144 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1978), vacated, 23
Cal. 3d 742, 591 P.2d 527, 153 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1979).
20. Comm. Standard Jury Instructions, Criminal, Super. Ct., L.A. County, CALIF. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS CraM., 4th ed. CALJIC 4.60 (Supp. 1984).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
22. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).
23. Id. at 360-61.
24. Pope, Rule 34: Controlling the Paper Avalanche, 7 LITIGATION, Spring 1981, at 28.
25. United States v. IBM. One of the many published opinions in the case is 406 F.
Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
26. Pope, supra note 24, at 28.
27. Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Brown & Root, Inc., No. 81-H-0686-C, 130th
Jud. Dist., Matagorda County, Tex.
28. Arthurs, supra note 6, at 5.
29. FED. R. Evm. 401.
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"having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence."30 The trial
admissibility test is stricter than the pretrial discoverability stan-
dard, but even the trial test is so broad that in large antitrust and
commercial litigation, the attorneys can justify offering "tens or
even hundreds of thousands" of documents.3 1 That volume of in-
formation obviously would overwhelm the typical trier of fact. A
theory enables the attorney to reduce radically the volume of evi-
dence introduced at trial. The theory becomes the relevance stan-
dard.3 2 To reduce the quantity of evidence to manageable propor-
tions, the attorney offers only the evidence that contributes
directly to the development of the theory.33
B. Theme
Properly defined, a theme differs fundamentally from a the-
ory. The theme is the label for the attorney's strongest argument
on the pivotal element of the theory.3 4 Some writers suggest that
the theme is "the strong point of your case"3 5 or the one idea that
"tells the jury why your client should win the case."'3 6 However, the
concept of theme is susceptible to a more precise definition.
The theme should relate to the pivotal element of the theory.
If the parties have evolved the case adequately during pretrial dis-
covery, by the time of trial the case may be reducible to a single
issue.3 7 Pretrial discovery can narrow the controversy between the
parties to a particular element of the theory. In a battery prosecu-
tion, the issue may be the attacker's identity. Assume, for instance,
that although there is overwhelming evidence of an assault in a
hotel, the victim initially was hesitant in identifying the defendant.
The defendant's statement to the police was a denial of any in-
volvement in the attack. In this situation, the prosecutor reasona-
bly can anticipate that the focus of the trial will be the identity
element of his or her theory. In some respects, it is easier to iden-
30. Id.
31. Quinn, Documents at Trial Require Careful Preparation, LEGAL TIMEs, Aug. 19,
1985, at 11.
32. See S. GOLDBERG, supra note 13, at 93.
33. J. TANFORD, supra note 12, at 486.
34. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 1, § 1-2.
35. Turley, supra note 5, at 88.
36. S. GOLDBERG, supra note 13, at 89.
37. T. MAUET, supra note 10, § 1.4.
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tify the central element today than in the past, particularly in civil
cases. Under recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, judges have expanded powers at pretrial conferences. 38
Many judges use their powers aggressively at those conferences to
pressure the parties into detailed stipulations. Extensive stipula-
tions facilitate the singling out of the outcome-determinative ques-
tion for trial.
The theme not only should relate to the pivotal element of the
theory; more specifically, the theme should embody the attorney's
most convincing argument on that element.3 9 The theme should in-
corporate the best common sense argument for prevailing on the
pivotal element.4 ° It is the argument to which the attorney hopes
the jury will resort during deliberation in order to counter the op-
ponent's most damning evidence on the central issue.41 In the bat-
tery hypothetical, the victim's early, uncertain identification of the
defendant may be the most damaging evidence to the prosecution's
theory. However, the other evidence in the case may suggest a per-
suasive counter-argument. The other evidence may show that the
victim was close to the attacker for several minutes. The treating
physician is prepared to testify that the victim suffered multiple
contusions and lacerations all over his body, and the hotel clerk
can add that he traced a long path of blood down a hallway and
into a restroom. The prosecutor's theme should be that although
the victim understandably was dazed immediately after the attack,
he had an excellent opportunity to observe the attacker's face.
Finally, the attorney should reduce the strongest argument on
the key element to a short, memorable expression.42 The expres-
sion is a shorthand label for the argument. In the battery case, the
prosecutor might capsulize43 the theme in the expression that the
victim was "so close to the attacker for so long" that the identifica-
tion is trustworthy. The attorney can use the theme as a pervasive
motif. 44 While the selection of the theory aids in simplifying the
case presentation, the theme lends continuity to the case. The at-
torney can insinuate or expressly mention the theme at every ma-
38. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (amendment allows judges to expedite disposition of action
and facilitate settlement through numerous pretrial conferences).
39. S. GOLDBERG, supra note 13, at 89.
40. Id. at 90; see also J. TANFORD, supra note 12, at 148.
41. S. GOLDBERG, supra note 13, at 90.
42. Lee, Painting the Whole Picture at Summation: Final Strokes, 19 TRIAL, July
1983, at 63, 66.
43. See R. CARLSON, SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES FOR CIVIL TRIALS § 6:10 (1983).
44. J. JEANS, supra note 14, § 8.4.
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jor phase of the trial.45
II. THE USE OF PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS To SELECT THE THEORY
AND THEME
The concepts of theory and theme help to explain the function
of pretrial procedures. At each major stage-intake, pleading, dis-
covery, and final case evaluation on the eve of trial-the attorney
must understand the concepts to appreciate his or her objectives.
A. Intake
At the intake stage, the attorney accepts the case and first in-
terviews the client. At this early juncture, one of the attorney's
principal goals is to identify every conceivable theory of the case.46
During intake, perhaps the worst sin an attorney can commit is
premature diagnosis. 47 The client undoubtedly has not disclosed to
the attorney all the information the client possesses. The client
may have forgotten some facts or may be withholding other data
until the attorney wins the client's trust. Further, the attorney has
not yet spoken with the other witnesses who may furnish addi-
tional or conflicting information. Finally, the attorney may know
little or nothing about the areas of law involved in the case. For all
these reasons, the attorney should use the intake stage primarily to
develop a list of plausible theories. The attorney engages in the
type of analysis expected of law students on first-year examina-
tions.48 In the generator contract hypothetical, after interviewing
the client the plaintiff's attorney tentatively might identify five po-
tential theories: an oral offer and acceptance; a written contract
resting on an acceptance that exactly matches the terms of the of-
fer;49 a written contract based on UCC section 2-207 even though
the terms of the purported acceptance do not exactly match those
of the offer;50 promissory estoppel;51 and quasi-contract. 52
45. R. KEETON, supra note 10, § 10.6.
46. See generally D. BINDER & P. BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION: FROM HYPOTHESIS TO
PROOF (1984); CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, FACT INVESTIGATION: FROM
THEORY THROUGH DISCOVERY (1985).
47. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH 86 (1977).
48. See S. KINYON, INTRODUCTION TO LAW STUDY AND LAW EXAMINATIONS 126 (1971).
49. J. MURRAY, CONTRACTS § 54, at 111 (2d rev. ed. 1974) (the common-law "mirror
image" rule requiring an unconditional acceptance).
50. Id. § 51, at 114-16.
51. Id. §§ 92-93.




The next major stage in pretrial processing is pleading. The
function of this stage is to eliminate theories lacking legal merit.
The attorney should abandon any theory that cannot withstand a
motion to dismiss or demurrer.5 3 By this point, the attorneys have
had an opportunity to conduct legal research, and they now can
appraise the legal merits of the causes of action, crimes, and de-
fenses that the parties have pleaded. Suppose, for instance, that
the plaintiff's attorney has pleaded the promissory estoppel theory
identified during intake but has alleged reliance on a vague prom-
ise by the defendant. In some jurisdictions, even under a promis-
sory estoppel theory, the defendant's promise must satisfy the nor-
mal definiteness test for contract promises.54 If the defendant
discovers that rule of law during research, he successfully can move
to dismiss that count from the complaint. For that matter, even if
the defendant does not demur, the plaintiff's attorney should
abandon the theory unless a realistic likelihood exists that the
court will overturn the rule of law. Most jurisdictions subscribe to
the view than even if a defendant fails to make a pretrial motion to
dismiss a legally insufficient count, the issue of legal sufficiency can
be raised for the first time at trial or on appeal.55 The view obtains
in both civil 56 and criminal 57 cases. Taking a legally insufficient
count to trial builds a ground for appeal into the case. The pres-
ence of the count in the pleading creates an unnecessary risk that
on appeal, the attorney will lose a favorable trial court judgment.
Moreover, the presence of the legally insufficient count makes it
less likely that the attorney will win a favorable judgment in the
trial court. If the judge dismisses the count during trial in the
jury's hearing, the dismissal may prompt the jurors to question the
remaining counts. Losing the battle over the insufficient count
makes it less probable that the attorney will win the war.
C. Discovery
The function of the discovery stage parallels that of the plead-
ing stage. The purpose of this stage is to winnow out theories lack-
53. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 430.30 (West 1973).
54. See J. MURRAY, supra note 49, § 92.
55. 71 C.J.S. Pleading § 560 (1951).
56. Id.




ing factual merit. Assume that before the attorney filed the com-
plaint in the generator contract case, he or she believed in good
faith that discovery would yield a set of documents constituting a
matching offer and acceptance. After thorough discovery, however,
the attorney could not locate such a set. In this circumstance, the
defense could obtain summary judgment on that count in the com-
plaint.5" As in the case of a theory lacking legal merit, the plain-
tiff's attorney should jettison the unsubstantiated theory even if
the defense fails to move for summary judgment. Notwithstanding
its failure to move for summary judgment, the defense can attack
the legal sufficiency of the evidence for the first time at trial. 9 The
plaintiff's attorney could suffer a directed verdict on that count
during trial.60 Worse still, a directed verdict on one count reduces
the likelihood of obtaining a favorable judgment on the other,
sound counts. The unsupported count is "a strawman whom the
opponent can easily destroy."6 1 The weak count may lower the
general credibility of the attorney's case in the jurors' eyes. After
rejecting the unsupported count, the jurors may leap quickly to the
conclusion that the other counts are equally meritless.
D. Final Pretrial Case Evaluation
The attorney's task is simple if at the close of discovery, there
is only one theory remaining with both legal and factual merit. The
attorney can identify the theory merely by exercising the tradi-
tional skills of legal analysis-evaluating the legal sufficiency of the
counts and the evidence supporting each count. The attorney can
arrive at the theory by process of elimination. In complex litiga-
tion, however, even after complete discovery, several tenable theo-
ries may remain. In the generator contract hypothetical, the attor-
ney may conclude that the oral contract, UCC section 2-207, and
quasi-contract theories all have factual and legal merit.
Should the attorney take all three theories to trial? The initial
impulse might be to do so just to be on the safe side. Yet most
experienced litigators answer the question in the negative. It cer-
tainly is inadvisable to take multiple theories to trial when the the-
ories are inconsistent.2 With their law school training, lawyers and
judges are comfortable with "even if" arguments: the defendant
58. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56; CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 437c (West Supp. 1985).
59. 88 CJ.S. Trial § 252 (1955).
60. Id.
61. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 1, § 1-3.
62. R. KEETON, supra note 10, § 10.6.
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has an alibi; but even if he was present at the crime scene, he was
entrapped. However, laypersons naturally find such arguments cu-
rious and suspect. Common sense tells them that the defendant
either was or was not present. When the defense relies on inconsis-
tent arguments, the jurors understandably doubt the defense's
candor. There is even a grave risk in taking multiple consistent
theories to trial.63 Urging secondary theories can "weaken your pri-
mary contention."64 Pressing several theories compounds the dan-
ger of jury confusion, and jurors may treat the attorney's invoca-
tion of other theories as evidence of the attorney's lack of faith in
the primary theory. In the opinion of most seasoned litigators,
when faced with multiple theories, the attorney must exercise stra-
tegic professional judgment and choose a single theory for trial.65
The difficulty is that the attorney cannot base the choice on
purely legal analysis. The supposition is that all the remaining the-
ories rest on recognized legal rules and are sustained by legally suf-
ficient evidence. The choice calls for prudential judgment rather
than legal analysis. In making the choice, the attorney should con-
sider the following factors, inter alia:66
(1) Which theory has the largest volume of and most cogent
corroboration? 67 All the theories have bare factual merit in the
sense that they can defeat a summary judgment motion. However,
if one theory has superior corroboration-disinterested, unequivo-
cal lay eyewitness testimony or testimony by an eminently creden-
tialed expert-the availability of the corroboration cuts in favor of
selecting that theory.
(2) Is the theory based on substantial justice rather than a rule
that may strike the jurors as a legal technicality?6 8 In the genera-
tor contract hypothetical, the defense may have tenable fraud and
Statute of Frauds theories. Both defenses could survive a motion
to strike, and there is enough evidence supporting each theory that
at trial, the judge would have to instruct the jury on the defense. A
lay juror, however, probably would find the latter defense unat-




66. In major cases, rather than engage in this multi-factor analysis, some attorneys
test possible theories by submitting them to mock juries before trial. Couric, Winning,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 2, 1985, at S14.
67. See J. TANFORD, supra note 12, at 489.
68. See id. at 148.
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might conclude that the defendant was invoking a legal technical-
ity to walk away from a freely bargained agreement."" At a subcon-
scious level, the layperson might find it difficult to excuse nonper-
formance for the apparently trivial reason that the parties did not
document the agreement.
(3) Will the judge give the jury an instruction with favorable
language about the theory? The jurors know that the attorneys are
partisan advocates-that is, "hired guns." Consequently, the jurors
discount what the attorneys say during trial.70 The jurors accord
far more significance to what the judge says at trial, including the
judge's statements in the final jury charge. If there is a pattern
instruction with favorable language on one theory, during summa-
tion an astute attorney can use the instruction to convince the jury
that in some sense, the judge approves of the attorney's theory.
Assume that for the other possible theories, the pattern instruc-
tions contain bland language or, worse, no pattern instruction ex-
ists. The attorney will have to overcome the judge's reluctance to
give a special instruction. The availability of a favorable instruc-
tion on the other theory points toward the choice of that theory for
trial.
(4) Does the theory cast the client in a role with which the
jurors can identify?71 Suppose that the two available theories are
breach of contract and breach of warranty. If the plaintiff's attor-
ney opts for the former theory, the jurors may view the case as a
contest between two businesses. On the other hand, if the attorney
chooses the latter theory, the attorney can cast the plaintiff in the
role of consumer with whom many jurors will be able to empathize.
(5) Does the theory require that the jurors find intentional
misconduct by the opposing party? Many commentators have
pointed out that jurors are loath to conclude that a witness has
committed perjury.7 2 A contention that the witness is mistaken or-
dinarily is more palatable.7 3 By the same reasoning, a juror may be
hesitant to find that the opposing party perpetrated an intentional
misdeed. Thus, it may be preferable to defend a contract action on
69. See E. FARNSWORTH & W. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 122-23 (3d
ed. 1980) ("technical" defenses).
70. Dombroff, Jury Instructions Can Be Crucial in Trial Process, LEGAL TIMES, Feb.
25, 1985, at 26.
71. Begam, Opening Statement: Some Psychological Considerations, 16 TRIAL, July
1980, at 33, 34-36.
72. P. BERGMAN, TRIAL ADVOCACY 288-89 (1979).
73. K. HEGLAND, supra note 10, at 47.
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the ground of mutual mistake rather than outright fraud.
Nothing guarantees that after weighing these factors, the at-
torney will find that they all conveniently cut in favor of the same
theory. The choice is obvious if they do. But in many cases the
factors may point in different directions. For example, although a
fraud defense may be more appealing to the jurors' sense of justice
than a Statute of Frauds theory, there may be superior corrobora-
tion for the latter theory. In that event, to choose a trial theory,
the attorney not only must consider each factor, but also must de-
cide the weight to attach to each factor-another level of
judgment.
The selection of the theory does not complete the pretrial case
evaluation. The attorney still must attempt to predict the pivotal
trial issue and formulate a theme to win the issue. "Every case
without exception has a main controlling issue. '74 In a major case
in which the parties enter into detailed stipulations, it can be a
simple matter to identify the element of the theory that will be the
central focus at trial. The stipulations may eliminate practically
every element but one. In other cases, the attorney must review
the course of pretrial discovery to forecast the issue. The key clue
often is the content of the opposing attorney's questions at the
deposition of the attorney's client. If the vast majority of the ques-
tions dealt with contract formation, one might expect that that ele-
ment of the plaintiff's theory will be the battleground at trial.
After identifying the pivotal element, the attorney must devise
a theme for the element. The attorney must identify the argument
that has the greatest common sense appeal to counter the opposi-
tion's best evidence on the central issue. The battery case will turn
on the identification element. In that case, a prosecution theme
stressing the victim's long opportunity for close observation of the
attacker may be optimal. If the opposition has superior percipient
witness testimony on the key issue but the testimony is at odds
with an item of physical evidence, the theme should highlight the
physical evidence. When the physical evidence is a skidmark in the
defendant's lane, the plaintiff's attorney might employ the theme,
"the case of the telltale skidmark." 75 As in choosing the trial the-
ory, the selection of the trial theme calls for an exercise of pruden-
tial judgment. There may be a myriad of possible arguments and
74. Beasley, Closing Statements, in TRIAL PRACTICE FOR THE GENERAL PRACrI-
TIONER-COURSE OF STUDY TRANSCRIPT 98, 99 (L. Packel ed. 1980).
75. Lee, supra note 42, at 66.
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themes that would be legally permissible and that are supported
by sufficient evidence. An analysis of the legal issues, even the legal
sufficiency of the supporting evidence, will not suffice.
III. THE USE OF THE THEORY AND THEME AT TRIAL
The judgments made on the theory and theme are vital be-
cause they should determine almost everything that the attorney
does at trial. As one well-respected litigator has remarked, "the
trial is only the playing out of the theory. '7 6 Every step at trial is
explicable in terms of the theory and theme, and explaining the
trial in these terms gives new meaning to many of the old bromides
about trial advocacy.
A. Jury Selection
There is probably more lore and legend about jury selection
than any other part of the trial.7 7 In some jurisdictions, the attor-
ney may make short preliminary remarks to the panel even before
questioning the panel members. One adage about jury selection is
that the remarks constitute the attorney's first opportunity for ad-
vocacy to the jury and that the attorney, therefore, should not
waste the opportunity by merely describing voir dire procedures.
Once the questioning begins, the conventional wisdom is that the
attorney should expose the weakness in his or her case.78 The at-
torney should obtain the panel members' commitment that they
will not decide the case against the attorney's client solely because
of that weakness. 79 Further, according to the commentators, the
attorney should attempt to indoctrinate the members on favorable
law.80 The jury selection stage concludes with challenges and
strikes. The attorney is supposed to use challenges and strikes to
eliminate panel members who might be predisposed to vote against
the attorney's case.
These adages border on the cliche.81 On first hearing, they
sound trite. Yet they can take on new meaning in light of the con-
cepts of theory and theme. The attorney's preliminary remarks
76. Jordan, supra note 9.
77. See, e.g., Darrow, Selecting a Jury, reprinted in J. JEANS, supra note 14, § 7.7.
78. Crump, Attorneys' Goals and Tactics in Voir Dire Examination, 43 Tx B.J. 244,
244-46 (1980).
79. Id.
80. J. JEANS, supra note 14, §§ 7.19-.22; J. TANFORD, supra note 12, at 240.
81. See Fahringer, "In the Valley of the Blind"--Jury Selection in a Criminal Case,
TRIAL D'L. J., Summer 1980, at 23.
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constitute an important opportunity for advocacy. More to the
point, the attorney can use the remarks to give the panel an abbre-
viated version of the theory of the case. In the generator contract
hypothetical, the plaintiff's attorney could make these remarks:
The parties, my client Ms. Kessel and the defendant, are asking you to re-
solve their disagreement. Ms. Kessel says that on January 1, 1985, the defen-
dant orally agreed to sell her a generator for $50,000. She also says that the
defendant broke that promise and now owes her $15,000. The defendant de-
nies that there was any such agreement. We are looking for jurors who can
fairly and impartially decide this dispute.2
In one or two minutes, the attorney tersely can describe the theory
and give the jury a framework for all the testimony that will de-
velop the theory.
There is also a large element of truth in the counsel that the
attorney should expose the "weakness" of his or her case during
voir dire and seek the members' commitment not to find against
the attorney's case because of that weakness. The weakness in
question is the opposition's best evidence on the pivotal element of
the theory. In the battery hypothetical, that evidence is the vic-
tim's early hesitancy in identifying the attacker. The evidence will
sound less damning to the jury, and the prosecutor will appear
more credible if he or she mentions the evidence before the defense
raises the issue:
Q: There may be evidence in this case that after the attack, Mr. Wil-
liams, the victim, was uncertain about identifying his attacker. Have you ever
had an experience in which you were uncertain in identifying someone, even a
friend?
Q: So would you necessarily reject Mr. Williams' testimony simply be-
cause of his earlier uncertainty?
The attorney can then indoctrinate on "the favorable law," that is,
the pattern jury instruction supporting the theme:
Q: At the end of this case, his honor is going to read you an instruction
on eyewitness identification. The instruction will tell you that in deciding
whether to believe Mr. Williams' identification of the defendant, you should
consider how close Mr. Williams was to the attacker. If his honor gives you
that instruction, will you do your best to follow it?
Q: And if he instructs you to consider how long the attack lasted-how
long Mr. Williams had to observe the attacker-will you carry out that
instruction?
Even the hoary sayings about striking "unfavorable jurors"
make more sense in light of the concepts of theory and theme.
Rather than inquiring generally whether the prospective juror
82. Cf. E. IMWINKELRMI, supra note 1, § 2-1a, at 32.
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probably will vote against the attorney's case, the attorney should
ask whether the panel member would be inclined to reject the
theme. The prosecutor in the battery case should strike any mem-
ber who was an undergraduate psychology major. In all likelihood,
a panel member with that major has been exposed to numerous
experiments indicating the unreliability of eyewitness identifica-
tion.8 3 The member would be dubious of the "so close for so long"
argument. The attorney has only a small number of strikes. The
best candidate for a strike, the juror the attorney least wants, is a
juror inclined to reject the attorney's theme."4
B. Opening Statement
As with jury selection, the opening statement is a critical stage
in the trial. The general consensus among practitioners is that in
most cases jurors ultimately return the same verdict that they
would have voted for immediately after the opening.8 5 The opening
statement is becoming more important today. In two-thirds of the
federal judicial districts and one-fifth of the states, attorneys no
longer participate in the voir dire examination; the judge conducts
the entire examination." In these jurisdictions, the opening state-
ment represents the attorney's initial chance to develop rapport
with the jurors. Commentators frequently assert that the attorney
should use the opportunity to tell the jurors a "story" about his or
her case. 7 In addition, the commentators urge that because the
trial judge usually allows so little time for opening the attorney
should eschew a diffuse, "shotgun" approach.8 8 The attorney in-
stead should concentrate on and spend more time discussing the
strength of his or her story.8 9
The commentators' advice becomes more concrete and usable
83. See Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap From
Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079 (1973) (summarizing many of the experiments). But
see McCloskey & Egeth, Eyewitness Identification: What Can a Psychologist Tell a Jury?,
38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 550 (1983) (questioning propriety of expert psychological testimony
concerning eyewitness identification); McCloskey & Egeth, A Time to Speak, or a Time to
Keep Silence?, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 573 (1983).
84. Annual Meeting of Trial Lawyers of America, 54 U.S.L.W. 2094, 2096 (Aug. 13,
1985) (reviewing psychologist-lawyer Lisa Blue's presentation).
85. See Klieman, A Checklist for Opening Statements, TRIAL DIPL. J., Summer 1985,
at 34; McElhaney, Opening Statements, 2 LITIGATION, Summer 1976, at 45;Vinson, How to
Persuade Jurors, 71 A.BA J. 72 (1985). But see J. TANFORD, supra note 12, at 215 n.54.
86. Fahringer, supra note 81, at 36 n.5.
87. J. JEANS, supra note 14, § 8.6, at 202.




if interpreted in light of the concepts of theory and theme. Simply
stated, the theory is the story. ° During opening statement, the at-
torney can go into much greater detail than in the preliminary re-
marks before voir dire examination, but both the remarks and the
opening statement should be used to advance the same theory.
Further, the "strength" that should be underscored during the
opening is the theme. In the battery hypothetical, the prosecutor
should devote the most time to previewing the testimony concern-
ing the length of the attack and the victim's proximity to the at-
tacker. The prosecutor might act out part of the attack to give the
jurors a sense of how long the attack lasted."1 At least once during
the opening-probably near the end when the judge is least likely
to sustain an objection that the prosecutor is becoming argumenta-
tive92-the attorney should sound the theme."
C. Structuring the Case-in-Chief
The psychological principles of primary and recency are well
settled: "[W]e tend to remember what we hear first and what we
heard last. ' 94 Trial attorneys long have appreciated that they
should apply those principles in determining the sequence of their
witnesses. 5 If the jurors will have the longest memory of what they
hear first and can recall most easily what they hear last, the case-
in-chief should begin and end with strong witnesses.9 6
The rub is defining a "strong" witness. Perhaps most litigators
assume that the opening witness should be the most dramatic wit-
ness. Starting with a dramatic witness arrests the jury's attention.
In medical malpractice cases, many plaintiffs' attorneys make it a
practice to call the defendant doctor as the first witness in the
plaintiff's case-in-chief. They reason that the jurors will be atten-
tive during the direct confrontation between the defendant and the
plaintiff's attorney. Similarly, many, if not most, litigators believe
that the closing witness should be the most sympathetic witness.
In personal injury practice, the plaintiff's final witness often is the
90. Klienaan, supra note 85, at 36.
91. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 1, § 3-4c, at 45.
92. See generally J. JEANs, supra note 14, § 8.13 (discussing argumentative objection).
93. Id. § 8.4.
94. Parker, Applied Psychology in Trial Practice, 7 DEF. L.J. 33, 35, 37 (1960).
95. Colley, Principles of Direct Examination, TRIAL DEPL. J., Spring 1979, at 15.
96. J. TANFORD, supra note 12, at 499 (citing T. MAunT, supra note 10, at 18); Schrag,
Preparing Witnesses for Trial, in 1 CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE DURING TRIAL § 5.5 (1982);
see also K. HEGLAND, supra note 10, at 11.
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seriously injured plaintiff. The obvious extent of the witness' inju-
ries presumably generates jury sympathy.
The term "strong" witness, however, can be redefined in light
of the concepts of theory and theme. The opening witness should
be the best theory witness. Under the primacy principle, the first
witness' testimony is the information the jurors will remember
longest.9 7 The attorney wants the jury to recall the theory through-
out the case because the theory functions as a conceptual frame-
work for all of the attorney's evidence. The jury may comprehend
the rest of the evidence better when the first witness is the best
theory witness. Suppose that in the generator contract hypotheti-
cal, the plaintiff's plant manager participated in the preliminary
negotiations, received the telephone call in which the defendant's
president informed the manager that the generator would not be
delivered, and supervised the cover efforts to find a substitute gen-
erator. The manager's testimony would give the jury an excellent
overview with which to appreciate all the later testimony about
formation, breach, and damages.
The concluding witness should be the best theme witness.
Under the recency principle, the last witness' testimony is the in-
formation that jurors can remember most easily.98 The attorney
must ensure that the jurors recall the theme during deliberation.
The best way to ensure their recall is to position the strongest
theme witness at the end of the case-in-chief. In the contract hypo-
thetical, the plaintiff's theme might be that although the defen-
dant now denies the existence of a contract, at one time the defen-
dant acted as if a contract did exist. At his deposition, the
defendant's shipping superintendent admitted that the defendant's
president had ordered him to box the generator for shipment and
that the defendant's routine practice is to prepare goods for ship-
ment only after a firm agreement has been reached.99 The superin-
tendent may not be the most dramatic or sympathetic witness.
However, his testimony may be the lynchpin of the plaintiff's best
argument for prevailing on the pivotal element of contract
formation.
97. Parker, supra note 94, at 35.
98. Id.
99. See E. IMWINKELEE:D, supra note 1, § 4-3, at 53.
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D. Organizing the Direct Examination
The recency principle applies to the organization of each wit-
ness' direct examination as well as to the overall sequencing of wit-
nesses.100 Therefore, many commentators recommend that liti-
gators end the direct examination on "a high note," "the most
significant item of evidence."' 011 Unfortunately, like "strong wit-
ness," "high note" is a vague expression. In the theory-theme
schema, however, "high note" is readily definable. The "high note'
is the testimony that most directly supports the theme. The end of
direct examination is a naturally emphatic position, and the attor-
ney wants to emphasize the testimony pertinent to the strongest
argument on the central element of the theory. By way of example,
assume that the defendant's shipping superintendent was present
when the defendant's president phoned the plaintiff's manager and
told the manager that the defendant refused to deliver the genera-
tor. If the plaintiff's attorney conducted the superintendent's di-
rect examination in chronological order, the witness would testify
about contract formation (boxing the generator for shipment)
before breach (the telephone call). That sequence would be unwise.
At trial, there will be little or no dispute that the defendant's pres-
ident made the phone call. The focus at trial will be on the ques-
tion of whether there was a contract. The attorney should deviate
from chronological order to end the direct examination with the
testimony about the theme and contract formation.
E. Cross-Examination
The threshold question in planning cross-examination is
whether the attorney should cross-examine the witness.10 2 It is not
a foregone conclusion that the attorney should cross-examine every
opposing witness. "An ancient rule of litigation is not to cross-ex-
amine a witness whose testimony has not been harmful."' 03 The
rule can be described more precisely as follows: Do not cross-ex-
amine a witness whose testimony has not been harmful to the at-
torney's theory. The opposing witness' testimony can be relevant
to the case without damaging the theory. Suppose, for example,
that the attorney is defending a murder case. The defensive theory
is self-defense. The prosecution witness, a forensic pathologist, tes-
100. K. HEGLAND, supra note 10, at 11.
101. J. JEANS, supra note 14, § 9.11, at 221.




tifies only that the pattern of the wounds indicates neither an acci-
dent nor suicide. The defense theory enables the attorney to neu-
tralize the pathologist's testimony. Since the testimony works no
harm to the self-defense theory, the attorney can excuse the wit-
ness without cross-examination. 10 4 The attorney might add: "Doc-
tor, you have been very helpful. Thank you. I see no need to cross-
examine you." 10 5
After the decision is made to cross-examine the witness, the
next question is what purposes should be pursued during the ex-
amination. Judge Goldstein, one of the leading American authori-
ties on trial advocacy, wrote that it is a "cardinal principle"' 0 6 that
"the primary purpose of cross-examination is to secure admissions
favorable to the side of the cross-examiner.'10 7 This principle also
can be recast in terms of theory and theme. An effective use of
cross-examination is to elicit opposing witnesses' testimony that
establishes the elements of the attorney's theory. The attorney
would love to be able to use opposing witnesses' testimony as cor-
roboration during closing argument.'0 More importantly, the best
use of cross-examination is to elicit opposing witnesses' testimony
that supports the theme. Most writers on cross-examination favor
a short cross, developing a handful of "major 'l109 or "salient" 10
points. In order to keep the questioning brief, the cross-examiner
must establish priorities. There usually is insufficient time to de-
velop all the facts that are supportive of the attorney's theory.
However, the choice of theme determines the priorities. Since the
theme represents the attorney's best hope for winning the case, the
first priority should be to seek corroboration for that argument. If
time is short, the attorney should elicit that corroboration even if
doing so means disregarding potential corroboration for other ele-
ments of the theory.
104. See Jenner, Meeting Expert Testimony-The Defense Perspective, in SCIENTIFIC
AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 87, 89 (E. Imwinkelried 2d ed. 1981).
105. Id.
106. Goldstein, The Cardinal Principles of Cross-Examination, in 1959 TRIAL LAW-
YER'S GUIDE 331 (I. Goldstein ed.).
107. Id. at 338.
108. See id.
109. See Browne, The Delicate Art of Cross-Examination, 5 CALIF. LAW., Apr. 1985, at
22, 24.
110. Comisky, Observations on the Preparation and Conduct of Cross-Examination,




Just as jurors are skeptical of statements made by the attor-
neys as advocates, jurors sometimes perceive that witnesses have a
financial or emotional "vested interest in the outcome of the
case." '111 In sharp contrast, jurors "typically listen more closely and
weigh more heavily almost everything said to them by the judge,
including the jury instructions." 1 2 Hence, commentators on trial
practice stress the need to request "instructions that favor you[r]"
case.
123
What are the sorts of "favorable" instructions that the attor-
ney should request? There are two types. First, the attorney
should ask for a substantive law instruction incorporating the at-
torney's theory of the case.1 4 The attorney should request that the
trial judge tailor the pattern instruction to the case by mentioning
the specific names, places, dates, and events involved in the litiga-
tion. 1 5 The more the judge uses specific references, the more the
substantive law instruction will sound like a repetition of the the-
ory that the attorney has been proclaiming throughout the trial.
Second, the attorney should request an instruction supporting
the theme. In most instances, this will be an evidentiary instruc-
tion. In the battery hypothetical, the prosecutor might ask for an
instruction on the manner in which the jurors should evaluate the
trustworthiness of the victim's eyewitness identification. Some
model instructions on eyewitness identification expressly direct the
jury to consider "how long. . . a time was available"11 6 for obser-
vation and "how . . . close the witness was. ' 117 The theme, "so
close for so long," contains the considerations mentioned in the in-
struction. The theme is ideal in that it uses the same words,
"close" and "long," employed in the instruction. When the jury
hears the judge's charge, it may sound as if the judge is legitimat-
ing the prosecutor's theme. The instruction will seem to confirm
what the prosecutor has said throughout the trial; namely, that it
is proper for the jury to decide the key identification element on
111. Dombroff, supra note 70, at 26.
112. Id.
113. T. MAUET, supra note 10, at 317.
114. S. GOLDBERG, supra note 13, at 95.
115. Dombroff, supra note 70, at 26.
116. Imwinkelried, Identification Evidence, in 15TH ANNUAL DEFENDING CRIMINAL
CASES: CHANGING FRONTIERS OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE 659, 694-95 (E. Margolin ed. 1977) (citing




the basis of the "how close" and "how long" considerations.
G. Closing Argument
In most jurisdictions, the last step before jury deliberation is
the attorneys' closing arguments or summations. As in jury selec-
tion, the topic of summation has generated a huge lore. 118 One
often repeated piece of advice is that early in the summation, the
attorney should try to simplify the case for the jury.1"9 The attor-
ney should attempt to "[reduce] the entire trial to one issue"120
"upon which ... the whole case revolves."' ' 2' The attorney should
focus on "the fundamental issue' 1 22 and give the jurors a rationale
for resolving that issue in favor of the attorney's client.' 28
These aphorisms can be understood in terms of the concepts
of theory and theme. The reason for choosing a theory and theme
is to give the trial presentation simplicity and continuity. At the
outset of the summation, the attorney can simplify the case by re-
stating the theory and listing the elements of the theory that are
undisputed or overwhelmingly proven. Of course, the remaining
fundamental issue is the pivotal element of the theory, and the
theme embodies the attorney's best argument for prevailing on the
element.'2 4 Hence, the theme should be the centerpiece of the clos-
ing argument.' 25 In the battery hypothetical, the body of the sum-
mation should elaborate upon the "so close for so long" theme. To
be sure, the attorney should reiterate the theme explicitly.' 26 How-
ever, the attorney can and should do more. The attorney should
review deliberately and meticulously all the testimony that sus-
tains the theme, particularly testimony by opposing witnesses. The
attorney should quote the jury instruction directing the jurors to
consider the length of the opportunity for observation and the vic-
tim's proximity to the attacker. In addition, the attorney should
118. See generally A. ORDOVER, 6 CRIMINAL LAW ADVOCACY: ARGUMENT TO THE JURY
(1982); L. SMITH, ART OF ADVOCACY: SUMMATION (1978).
119. See P. BERGMAN, supra note 72, at 279.
120. Id.; see also Stein, Interview with Jacob A. Stein-The Closing Argument, TRIAL
DIPL. J., Spring 1985, at 8, 11 ("a single determinative issue to the jury").
121. J. JEANS, supra note 14, § 16.12, at 376.
122. Beasley, Closing Statements, in TRuA PRACTICE FOR THE GENERAL PRACTI-
TIONER-COURSE OF STUDY TRANSCRIPT 98, 100 (L. Packel ed. 1980).
123. Vinson & Anthony, The Closing Argument: Applications of Attribution Theory,
TRIAL Dn'L. J., Spring 1984, at 33.
124. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 1, § 1-2.
125. S. GOLDBERG, supra note 13, at 394.
126. K. HEGLAND, supra note 10, at 38-40.
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give the jury an analogy, based on common experience, that dem-
onstrates that the argument incorporated in the theme makes
sense. 27 At an early point in the summation, the prosecutor might
assert that the attack lasted longer than the length of time he or
she had been speaking and that the attacker was closer to the vic-
tim than he or she was to the jury. The prosecutor could ask rhe-
torically whether anyone sitting in the jury box would have diffi-
culty identifying the prosecutor in the hallway after trial.'2 8 The
first words the attorney utters in preliminary remarks before voir
dire examination should state the theory, and the concluding
words in the summation should assert the theme.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is widespread realization among litigators that a sense
of strategic judgment is essential to success in trial practice. Ex-
perienced litigators often write about the necessity for a theory
and theme in trial work,'129 and legal journals frequently report ex-
ceptional settlements and verdicts attained by attorneys who have
critically evaluated their cases and devised sound theories and
themes. 30
It is becoming increasingly clear that the concepts of trial the-
ory and theme should play an equally important role in designing
law school litigation courses. The thrust of sections II and III of
this Essay was to demonstrate both that the purpose of pretrial
procedure is to put the attorney in a position to make an intelli-
gent choice of theory and theme and that the choice dictates virtu-
ally everything the attorney does at trial. It is possible to teach a
litigation course with an exclusive focus on mechanics and tactics.
However, such a course is incomplete. The course may succeed in
teaching students what procedural tools are available and how to
use the procedures for the greatest short-term advantage, but
mechanics and tactics cannot answer the most important question:
why? Only a litigation course that concentrates on strategic judg-
ment-a course that uses theory and theme as its organizing con-
cepts-can provide satisfactory answers to that question.
Moreover, litigation courses can make their maximum contri-
bution to the curriculum only if the courses are designed to achieve
127. McElhaney, Analogies in Final Argument, 6 LITIGATION, Winter 1980, at 37, 37-
38.
128. See J. TANFORD, supra note 12, at 180 (use of rhetorical questions).
129. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 9, at 5; Shrager, supra note 7, at 39.
130. Arthurs, supra note 6, at 5.
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the broader objective of developing students' professional judg-
ment. Clients value attorneys not only for their legal expertise but
also for their prudential judgment. The client views the attorney as
a counselor as well as a legal technician. 1 ' Before making a final
decision whether to go to trial or to waive a right, the client wants
the benefit of both the attorney's mature perspective and his or
her legal knowledge. 13 2
Litigation courses that are built around the concepts of theory
and theme are excellent vehicles for helping students develop pro-
fessional judgment. Such courses force students beyond traditional
legal analysis and require them to grapple with difficult strategic
questions: Which theory will best encourage the jurors to identify
with the client? Which theme will most effectively counter the cli-
ent's prior inconsistent statement immediately after the incident?
These questions are not only outcome-determinative at trial; they
are questions that demand analysis beyond an appraisal of rules of
law and the legal sufficiency of evidence.
To some extent students can pursue the same educational ob-
jective in conventional substantive law courses. The authors of
some recently published casebooks for substantive law courses
commendably have gone out of their way to include counseling
questions requiring that the students utilize prudence as well as
precedent. 3 3 In those courses, however, a discussion of judgmental
problems usually comes at a cost. Time is lost that could-and
some say should-be devoted to developing legal analysis and
teaching doctrine. In litigation courses that are based on the con-
cepts of theory and theme, every class session should advert to the
concepts and thus become another opportunity to develop and ex-
ercise professional judgment.3 4 Law schools should graduate stu-
dents qualified to serve as counselors at law. 35 The schools will
discharge that duty far more effectively when litigation courses fi-
nally realize their potential for developing students' prudential
judgment.
131. See generally D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 47; A. WATSON, THE LAWYER IN
THE INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELLING PROCESS 151 (1976) ("lawyer's counselling activity ne-
cessitates that he state some opinion").
132. R KEETON, supra note 10, § 1.4.
133. See, e.g., D. VERNON, CONTRACTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE § 1.04 (1980).
134. See generally D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 47.
135. A. WATSON, supra note 131, at vii (a purpose of studying interviewing and coun-
seling is to help law students increase sensitivity to themselves and to client).
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